Study Examines Growing Strains on Peer Review

Carl Bergstrom of the University of Washington and Kevin Gross of North Carolina State University have used mathematical modeling to capture a mounting imbalance in academic publishing: too many submissions and too few reviewers. Their PLOS Biology paper outlines a self-perpetuating cycle in which the strain on reviewers feeds back into the system, reducing its efficiency and predictability.

The authors describe how an effective review process sustains itself through selectivity. When reviewers can devote appropriate attention to each manuscript, editors make consistent decisions, and scientists submit only their best work to the most competitive outlets. As volume increases, however, reviewers’ efforts become thinner, editorial outcomes less stable, and authors more inclined to try their luck elsewhere. Each resubmission triggers new rounds of review, amplifying the stress across journals.

Bergstrom and Gross note that dependence on unpaid volunteer labor has always made the system precarious, yet current conditions appear especially severe. Scientific communities have expanded and become less cohesive, dampening the sense of obligation to review. Large commercial publishers, recognizing the profitability of academic publishing, have launched numerous new journals that further multiply review demands. Rejected papers circulate repeatedly, consuming new sets of reviewers each time. The pandemic compounded the problem by prompting many researchers to scale back unpaid commitments, and participation has not fully recovered.

Although the integrity of scientific literature primarily rests with authors, both scholars caution that an overstretched system may allow small cracks to surface—issues that, while not catastrophic, undermine confidence in research and weaken social trust in science. They warn against the temptation to rely on artificial intelligence as a substitute for human review, emphasizing that peer review also serves as a forum for constructive critique that helps researchers refine their ideas.

To stabilize the process, Bergstrom and Gross propose several interventions. Paying reviewers—especially when serving for-profit journals—could provide fairness and immediate incentive without major coordination. Another idea is to reward exceptional reviews monetarily. Longer-term improvement, they suggest, may depend on universities shifting promotion and hiring standards away from counting publications toward valuing the quality of a few significant contributions. Adjusting these incentives could help restore balance to the reviewing system and preserve its role in sustaining credible science.